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The Diversity Feedback Loop
Patrick Shin, Devon Carbado, and Mitu Gulatit
INTRODUCTION
By most accounts, the pursuit of racial diversity in the
modern elite US workplace is ubiquitous. While the extent to
which firms genuinely care about achieving diversity may be
debatable, that corporations routinely assert that diversity is
good for business is not. The salience of this corporate refrain
raises a specific question about law: Is there a tension between
firms expressing an interest in pursuing diversity, on the one
hand, and the space they have to do so, on the other, under
current antidiscrimination law? Arguably, there is.> Given
recent doctrinal developments,2 it is uncertain whether Title VII
permits race-conscious hiring measures that seek to reap the
workplace benefits of racial diversity, especially if such
measures do not fit the mold of traditional affirmative action
t Faculty at Suffolk, UCLA and Duke, respectively. For comments on or
conversations about this article, we thank Guy-Uriel Charles, Cheryl Harris, Sung Hui
Kim, Kimberly Krawiec, Stephen Yeazell, and Eric Blumenson. We also thank
participants at a conference celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Civil Rights Act at
Michigan Law School and at colloquia at Duke Law School, USC Law School, Suffolk
University Law School, and Wash U School of Law. Special thanks to Sam Bagenstos
and Ellen Katz for giving us the impetus to do this piece.
1 See, for example, New York City Bar Association Committee on Labor and
Employment Law, Employer Diversity Initiatives: Legal Considerations for Employers
and Policymakers, *1-3 (New York City Bar April 2012), online at
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072272-EmploymentDiversitylnitiatives
.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014) (describing the tension); John David Skrentny, After Civil
Rights: Racial Realism in the New American Workplace ch 1 (Princeton 2014) (noting the
tension between the practice of diversity and the formal dictates of Title VII). For a
recent study of employer practices relating to workplace diversity, see Soohan Kim,
Alexandra Kalev, and Frank Dobbin, Progressive Corporations at Work: The Case of
Diversity Programs, 36 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 171, 205-06 (2012).
2 See, for example, Ricci v DeStefano, 557 US 557, 563 (2009) (holding that Title
VII does not permit race-conscious action to alleviate racial disparities in the workforce
unless employer has "strong basis in evidence" that failure to take such action would
result in liability for disparate impact).
345
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FOR UM
plans designed to remedy "manifest imbalances" associated with
past discrimination. 3
There is little doubt that at some point in the near future,
the Supreme Court will weigh in on this question.4 In
anticipation of that intervention, this Article seeks to
understand the significance of workplace affirmative action from
a broader, systemic perspective that scholars have largely
overlooked. We step back from the question of whether employer
affirmative action can be doctrinally and theoretically justified
by appeal to the value of diversity and examine, instead, the role
affirmative action plays in shaping workplace diversity.
Significantly, our inquiry is not limited to workplace affirmative
action plans: we focus our attention on university affirmative
action plans as well. We do so to investigate the relationship
between workplace diversity and what we hypothesize to be a
critical determinant: the diversity of the colleges and
universities that feed the employment market. We examine, in
short, the causal relation between diversity in the workplace
and diversity in the student bodies of higher educational
institutions. We describe this often overlooked relationship to
situate race-conscious hiring by employers in the context of
other important systemic factors that contribute to the
production of workplace diversity. Our hope is that the
framework we employ will inform the debate about the legal
permissibility of employer affirmative action that is sure
to come.
For purposes of the discussion, we assume that it is an open
question whether employers can invoke the value of diversity to
justify their affirmative action policies. 5 We assume further
that, as recently restated by the Supreme Court in Fisher u
See Johnson v Transportation Agency, 480 US 616, 631-40 (1987) (applying
manifest imbalance test to justify gender-conscious employment decision); United
Steelworkers v Weber, 443 US 193, 208-09 (1979) (holding that voluntary race-conscious
hiring plan falls within Title VII's purpose of correcting a manifest imbalance). For a
detailed argument that Ricci contravenes certain key aspects of Johnson and Weber, see
Sachin S. Pandya, Detecting the Stealth Erosion of Precedent: Affirmative Action After
Ricci, 31 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L 285, 299 (2010).
4 See Roberto L. Corrada, Ricci's Dicta: Signaling a New Standard for Affirmative
Action Under Title VII?, 46 Wake Forest L Rev 241, 241 (2011) (noting current
uncertainty about the legal standards governing the permissibility of voluntary
affirmative under Title VII).
But see Taxman v Board of Education, 91 F3d 1547 (3d Cir 1996) (en banc)
(rejecting the diversity rationale under Title VII), cert granted, 521 US 1117 (1997), cert
dismissed, 522 US 1010 (1997).
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University of Texas at Austin,6 the value of diversity can justify
a university's consideration of race as a factor in deciding which
applicants to admit.7 Given the accepted value of diversity in the
constitutional setting8 and the common goals of educational
affirmative action and of Title VII (such as reducing
discrimination and promoting racial integration),9 many have
argued that affirmative action is as normatively desirable and
as necessary in the workplace context as it is in the university
context. The thinking is that, because workplaces should be in
equipoise with universities with respect to realizing the benefits
of diversity, the normative justifications for diversity and the
policy mechanism for implementing it-affirmative action-
should be transplanted from the educational context to the
employment context. 10
Multiple scholars have endorsed some version of the
"transplant" argument." Some support their position by
6 133 S Ct 2411 (2013).
See id at 2420-21 (remanding for determination of whether university's
consideration of race in admissions was narrowly tailored to achieve student body
diversity).
8 See id at 2421.
9 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and
Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L 1, 38 (2005).
10 See id at 23-26. Some scholars frame this argument in terms of the basic goals of
antidiscrimination law, including Title VII-namely, to eliminate racial disparities and
inequalities in the employment context. See id at 4. This entails increasing the number
of racial minorities in workplaces where they are underrepresented-in other words,
increasing racial diversity in those contexts. Affirmative action is a sensible way to do
that. So, if the value of diversity justifies race-conscious action in the educational
context, and if we agree that racial diversity also has positive value under Title VII, it
would seem to follow that race-conscious action should also be justified in the
employment context.
" See Michael J. Yelnosky, The Prevention Justification for Affirmative Action, 64
Ohio St L J 1385, 1400-08 (2003) (exploring the correlation between the goals of Title
VII and affirmative action); Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: the
Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 Va L Rev
1893, 1947-56 (2009) (explaining that contact and exposure to minorities may help
reduce implicit stereotypes and unconscious discrimination); Kenneth R. Davis, Wheel of
Fortune: A Critique of the 'Manifest Imbalance" Requirement for Race-Conscious
Affirmative Action Under Title V1, 43 Ga L Rev 993, 1032-55 (2009) (describing how the
goals of Title VII are enhanced by voluntary affirmative action without the manifest
imbalance requirement); Tristin K. Green, Race and Sex in Organizing Work: "Diversity,"
Discrimination, and Integration, 59 Emory L J 585, 600-05 (2010) (showing that race or
gender conscious work organizing decisions can foster an integrated work environment
that will reduce biases and stereotyping); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Note, Grutter at Work:
A Title VII Critique of Constitutional Affirmative Action, 115 Yale L J 1408, 1442-47
(2006) (explaining that workplaces, like schools, benefit most from integration rather
than remediation); Katherine M. Planer, Comment, The Death of Diversity? Affirmative
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analogizing the persistence of educational inequalities and the
underrepresentation of students of color at colleges and
universities to existing employment inequalities and the
underrepresentation of people of color in the modern workplace.
Others highlight the similarities between the remedial purposes
of Title VII and those of the Equal Protection Clause. Still others
invoke empirical evidence showing how the presence of diversity
can reduce discriminatory bias and harmful stereotyping not
only at colleges and universities but in the workplace as well.
We do not argue that the transplant approach is mistaken.
The benefits of educational and workplace diversity may indeed
be comparable. The problem is that scholars who justify
affirmative action in the workplace by analogy to education
overlook a crucial fact: the university and the workplace are not
separate and distinct institutional settings in which diversity is
or is not achieved. They are part of a causally
connected system. 12
This is no small thing. It means that the policies and
practices surrounding diversity in each context shape and
influence the diversity that emerges in the other. Scholars,
policy makers, and judges have largely ignored this crucial
dynamic. They continue to frame affirmative action practices in
the workplace and those at colleges and universities as
Action in the Workplace After Parents Involved, 39 Seton Hall L Rev 1333, 1354-57
(2009) (considering the viability of the diversity rationale for race-conscious employment
decisions); Estlund, 26 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L at 23-26 (cited in note 9); Jared M.
Mellott, Note, The Diversity Rationale for Affirmative Action in Employment After
Grutter: The Case for Containment, 48 Wm & Mary L Rev 1091, 1103-04 (2006) (noting
the Supreme Court has only accepted affirmative action programs that serve the same
goals as Title VII and rejecting extension of diversity rationale for affirmative action
beyond educational context); Anita Bernstein, Diversity May Be Justified, 64 Hastings L
J 201, 218-24 (2012) (reviewing empirical studies concerning effect of diversity on social
welfare and the workplace); Ronald Turner, Grutter, the Diversity Justification, and
Workplace Affirmative Action, 43 Brandeis L J 199, 233-34 (2005) (expressing concern
that along with its benefits, diversity justifications may extract opportunities from
non-minorities); Corey A. Ciocchetti and John Holcomb, The Frontier of Affirmative
Action: Employment Preferences & Diversity in the Private Workplace, 12 U Pa J Bus L
283, 314-24 (2010) (recognizing that contemporary employers implement affirmative
action plans to foster a diverse workforce, rather than to remediate past wrongs); Jerry
Kang and Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of
"Affirmative Action" 94 Cal L Rev 1063, 1067-71 (2006) (surveying backward and
forward looking justifications for affirmative action).
12 Significantly, even when scholars point out potential difficulties with the
transplant approach, they generally treat the educational and workplace settings as
separate domains of diversity. The question these scholars then ask is whether diversity
really has the same value or function in these two settings and whether it follows that
these different diversity domains should be subject to the same legal constraints.
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disaggregated diversity mechanisms. This limits our ability to
understand fully what is at stake with respect to overruling
Grutter u Bollinger1 3 and/or prohibiting affirmative action in the
workplace. In this respect, analyses of diversity-based
affirmative action in the employment context or the educational
context are incomplete unless they take into account the
consequences that rules permitting or restricting such action in
either domain are likely to have for the system as a whole. We
examine these consequences by way of a model that we call the
"diversity feedback loop."
Three central features constitute our model: a supply effect,
a reiteration effect, and a demand effect. The schematic below
and accompanying texts describe how these three dynamics
combine to create the diversity feedback loop.
The Diversity Feedback Loop
SDiver, it of'
Eni1p oyieri Poo
Criteria
Ra -_CTISEFFECTO
Dn en .TDmanld fot
The basic dynamics are these:
The university through its admissions policy assembles a
diverse student body (or not) that upon graduation becomes a
key supply of labor for potential employers- supply effect.
To the extent that employers hire diverse students from the
supply of graduates, the level of diversity that exists in that
s 539 US 306 (2003).
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supply is reproduced or "reiterated" in the workplace-a
reiteration effect.
The employer's diversity hiring criteria exert a demand for
employees who have particular characteristics, which can
influence the criteria that universities use to determine the
students they admit-a demand effect.
The remainder of the paper elaborates on these dynamics to
demonstrate that we stand a better chance of improving the
diversity of universities and workplaces if we recognize that
both domains are part of the same diversity system. 14 This
insight is relevant not only as a normative matter (whether it
makes sense to promote affirmative action in both the workplace
and the university setting); it is also relevant as a doctrinal
matter (whether the legality of affirmative action in the context
of the workplace should be coextensive with the legality of
affirmative action in the context of the university).
Our argument unfolds in four parts. Part I discusses the
supply and reiteration effects. These effects follow from the fact
that universities are a gateway to the workplace. Today's
student bodies are tomorrow's potential workforces. To the
extent that employers rely on universities as a source of labor,
universities function as a pathway through which diversity is
supplied. The diversity of the university provides both a limit on
and a template for diversity in the workplace.
Yet, when employers hire from affirmative action
institutions, their own diversity-enhancing selection measures
(if any) might not mirror the measures implemented at the
university admissions stage. Employers in their hiring might
seek to realize a conception of diversity that differs in significant
ways from the educationally-rooted ideal of a diverse student
body. Consequently, actors in these two institutional settings
might "screen" for diversity in distinctive ways. Part II explores
the implications of the possible divergence between the employer
and university diversity screens.
14 Justice O'Connor's argument that affirmative action helps establish a visible
path to, and diversity at the level of, leadership is consonant with what we call the
supply effect, see Grutter, 539 US at 332-33. See also William G. Bowen and Derek Bok,
The Shape of the River 128-31 (Princeton 1998) (discussing reasons why attendance at a
selective university might enhance career opportunities). Our account goes beyond this
insight by modeling how the diversity pathway functions and by showing that this
linkage is just one aspect of the system that connects university and workplace diversity.
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Part III demonstrates how the hiring practices of employers
can influence the admissions practices of universities.
Universities operate within multiple competitive markets.
Among other things, they are competing to place their students
with the best employers. Students, in turn, likely evaluate
schools at least in part based on their placement rates.
Universities with poor placement records are at a competitive
disadvantage relative to those with stronger ones. This creates
an incentive for universities to supply the kind of diversity that
employers want.15 Doing so maximizes the likelihood that
employers will hire the graduates of those universities. To the
extent that universities structure their diversity initiatives to
maximize the employment opportunities available to their
graduates, the diversity preferences of employers exert a
demand on the university's admissions regime. Part III
discusses this demand effect.
I. THE SUPPLY AND REITERATION EFFECTS
A. The Basic Supply Hypothesis
The Supreme Court recognized long ago that the
composition of the relevant labor market can constrain an
employer's ability to eliminate patterns of racial exclusion from
its workplace. 16 Of course, employers who engage in
discrimination (or who practice affirmative action) can cause
their workforces to be significantly less (or more) racially diverse
than the available pool of qualified labor. But the fact remains
that the makeup of that pool places certain limits on the
composition of the employer's workplace. For example, if there
are no Asian Americans in the labor pool, there will be no Asian
Americans in the workplace, no matter what hiring policies
1" While more and more companies hire workers from overseas, typically these hires
do not stand in for the diversity of US-born or identified racial minorities.
1" See Hazelwood School District v United States, 433 US 299, 308 (1977)
(acknowledging that the proper comparison is between the racial composition of the
school district's teaching staff and the qualified public school teacher population in the
relevant labor market); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v United States, 431 US
324, 339 n 20 (1977) ("[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that
nondiscriminatory hiring practices will, in time, result in a work force more or less
representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community
from which employees are hired.").
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employers use. Employers cannot create workplace diversity out
of thin air. They need a supply.
The importance of educational diversity as a source of
workplace diversity was emphasized in an amicus brief filed by
Fortune 100 Companies in the Fisher case. We quote directly
from the brief:
But amici [Fortune 100 Companies] cannot reach [the]
goal [of a diverse workforce] on their own. . . . When
amici make decisions about hiring and promotion, it is
critical that they be able to draw from a superior pool of
candidates-both minority and non-minority-who have
realized the many benefits of diversity in higher
education. There can be no question that "[t]he Nation's
future" does indeed continue to "depend[ ] upon
leaders"-including business leaders-"trained through
wide exposure to the ideas and mores of students as
diverse as this Nation of many peoples."17
The fact that employers rely on institutions of higher
education to provide a supply of diverse labor implies that the
achievement of racial diversity in the workplace will depend not
only on the behavior of employers, but also on the behavior of
educational institutions. Thus, workplace diversity is potentially
affected by the use of affirmative action by universities at the
admissions stage as well as by employers at the hiring stage.18 If
this is so, understanding the conditions necessary for achieving
17 Brief for Amici Curiae Fortune-100 and Other Leading American Businesses in
Support of Respondents, Fisher v University of Texas, Civil Action No 11-345, *13 (US
filed Aug 13, 2012) (emphasis omitted), quoting Regents of the University of California v
Bakke, 438 US 265, 313 (1977) (Powell) (quotation marks omitted). See also Sung Hui
Kim, The Diversity Double Standard, 89 NC L Rev 945, 948 (2011) (noting with reference
to the corporate briefs in Grutter v Bollinger litigation that they advanced the argument
that "diversity is good [for business] because it produces good inputs"). For other
discussions of how diversity figured into the amicus briefs filed by corporations during
the Grutter litigation, see Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-
Benefit Analysis of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 Wis
L Rev 795, 796-97, 820-37 (2005); David B. Wilkins, From "Separate is Inherently
Unequal" to "Diversity is Good for Business": The Rise of Market-Based Diversity
Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 Harv L Rev 1548, 1551, 1553-
55, 1557-59, 1576-78, 1583, 1586-87 (2004).
18 Bowen and Bok argue that affirmative action facilitates "the flow of talent-
particularly talented black men and women-through the country's system of higher
education and into the marketplace and larger society." Bowen and Bok, The Shape of
the River at xxi (cited in note 14) (highlighting that affirmative action creates a pipeline
of employees to the workplace).
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workplace diversity requires isolating the expected effects of
race-conscious selection measures at each stage. One way to do
so is to explore how, if at all, the diversity of the workplace is
affected by (1) the use of affirmative action in education; and
(2) the use of affirmative action by employers. This Article
provides a theoretical model for investigating these questions.
Before elaborating on this model, an important specification is
in order.
Although we believe that the model we describe below
applies to employers who hire from highly selective colleges and
universities generally, for simplicity, we narrow our focus to law
firms who hire their associates predominantly from highly
selective law schools. We will refer to the law firms that hire in
this way as "elite law firms" and the selective law schools from
which they hire as "elite law schools." Of course, elite law firms
hire from non-elite law schools, and non-elite firms hire from
elite law schools as well. That we have simplified our model in
this way should not obscure that (1) most of the literature on
racial diversity and law firms focuses on elite law firms, (2) elite
law firms are more likely to hire from elite law schools than
non-elite law schools, and (3) there is reason to believe that elite
law firms will hire very few people of color from non-elite law
schools.19 In this respect, our simplified model nevertheless
19 Although elite law firms may do some limited hiring from non-elite law schools,
for the most part, that hiring will not include black or Latino students. One explanation
for this behavior may be that, for a variety of reasons that are beyond the scope of this
essay, blacks and Latinos tend to receive lower grades in law school than their white and
Asian American counterparts. For a statistical examination of law school performance
gaps, see Timothy T. Clydesdale, A Forked River Runs Through Law School: Toward
Understanding Race, Gender, Age, and Related Gaps in Law School Performance and
Bar Passage, 29 L & Soc Inquiry 711, 725 (2004). Because elite law firm hiring from non-
elite law schools tends to be limited to the very top of the graduating class, blacks and
Latinos in non-elite firms might look proportionally underrepresented in the elite firm
workplace were we to define the hiring pool to include non-elite firms. Such a definition
might make our analysis more empirically grounded, but it would make it difficult for us
to model the expected effects of racial diversity in the hiring pool alone, not confounded
by the effects of employer selection for variables unrelated to race. By limiting the
definition of the hiring pool to elite law schools, we can factor out this confounding
variable. While elite law firms may care about the grades of black and Latino students at
elite law schools, their focus tends to be on whether these-and other-elite law school
students have met some threshold level of achievement, not on whether they are at the
top of their class. The more "elite" the law school, the less significant the grades (again,
above some threshold of academic performance). See Richard A. Matasar, Does the
Current Economic Model of Legal Education Work for Law Schools, Law Firms (or
Anyone Else)?, NYSBA J 20, 26 (Oct 2010) (noting this trend while challenging the
current economics of legal education and employment). Consequently, even if blacks and
Latinos at elite law firms receive lower grades than their white and Asian American
345] 353
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allows us both to track a real dynamic-the flow of diversity
from elite law schools to elite law firms-and describe our
theoretical hypothesis: namely, that the diversity of elite law
school student bodies is a causal determinant of the diversity of
elite law firm workplaces. It bears emphasizing that whatever
diversity exists in elite law firms has to come from somewhere,
and we have stipulated that elite law firms hire only from elite
law schools.
The question then becomes: What affects the diversity of
elite law schools? One answer is the school's admissions policy.
The diversity of an elite law school student body is at least
partly determined by that law school's positive consideration of
race as a factor in admissions, that is, its affirmative action
policy. The more robust the elite law school's race-conscious
affirmative action program, the more diverse its student body
will be; and the more diverse a law school's student body, the
more diverse its graduates. Since elite law firms, by our
definition, hire from the labor pool formed by these graduates, it
follows that the use of affirmative action by elite law schools is
causally linked to the racial composition, and hence the
diversity, of the workplace of these employers. 20
To summarize, a law school's admissions regime affects the
diversity of the student body; the diversity of the student body
shapes the diversity of the labor pool; and the diversity of the
labor pool impacts the diversity of law firms. These observations
together make up what we call the supply effect in the
university-workplace relation. With this preliminary hypothesis
in place, we now model how a legal rule permitting or restricting
race-conscious hiring might modulate the movement of diversity
from law school student bodies to the workplace of the law firm.
B. The Reiteration Effect: Default Case
We begin by establishing what we call a reiteration effect,
or the basic tendency of the level of diversity that exists in the
labor supply pool to be reproduced in the relevant workplace. As
counterparts, they are not outside of the elite law firm's hiring pool. Thus, by limiting
our definition of the relevant hiring pool to elite law school students, we can factor out
the confounding variable of class rank with a simple (albeit still idealizing) stipulation:
law firms are generally indifferent to grades in their hiring of elite law school graduates.
20 Of course, there are other factors at play. We do not claim that law school
affirmative action is the sole determinant of elite law firm diversity. It suffices for our
purposes that it is one significant factor.
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a predicate, we make three additional assumptions. 21 First, for
reasons previously discussed,22 we assume that, above some
threshold of satisfactory academic performance, elite law firms
are indifferent to grades. 23 We further assume that the diversity
of the group of students who achieve this level of academic
performance is the same as the diversity of the student body
overall. 24 These assumptions imply that most graduates of elite
law schools, including black and Latino students, are regarded
by elite law firms as equally qualified to be hired as associates. 25
Third, we stipulate that the graduates of all elite law schools
who are interested in working in an elite law firm are equally
willing to accept positions in all elite firms, 26 but that any given
firm can lure any particular graduate by expending more
resources on recruiting or by offering incentives, such as
stronger commitments about the kind of work incoming
associates will perform. Fourth, we assume that the law firm's
and the law school's conceptions of diversity are congruent
21 Many readers may balk at some of our more aggressive assumptions. Concededly,
some of our assumptions may be more stipulative than veridical. But keep in mind that
we are trying to isolate the intuitive operation of a small handful of variables. In order to
do this, we need to assume away a large number of complications. We do not deny that
these complications exist in the real world. The point, however, is that they are indeed
complications, and we think there is much insight to be gained in trying to think about
what would happen in their absence.
22 See note 19.
23 For completeness, let us stipulate also that elite law firms generally do not hire
students who fall below that threshold.
24 We stipulate only that the diversity of the set of elite graduates deemed "hirable"
by elite firms matches the diversity of the class as a whole and that firms do not
distinguish among hirable graduates in terms of grades; we need not assume an absence
of race-correlated grade disparity within the hirable group.
2' As discussed above, the purpose of this concededly aggressive stipulation is to
enable us to theorize how workplace diversity might be affected by the overall level of
racial diversity in law school student bodies and positive consideration of race (for the
sake of creating diversity) by law firms and law schools. Our stipulations are intended to
isolate these variables by assuming away complicating factors that might mask the basic
dynamics.
26 In reality, of course, law students may prefer certain firms over others based on a
variety of factors, such as location, practice area strengths, firm culture, diversity,
prestige, and reputation. Nevertheless, our assumption of law student indifference, like
our other assumptions, are designed to establish a workable baseline scenario that
allows us to explore the dynamic interaction of a few key variables. Introducing
complications such as law student preferences for particular law firms would likely
obscure the specific interactions that we wish to highlight. That said, our idealized
baseline scenario is just that-a baseline. Though beyond the scope of this paper, further
analysis could involve loosening one or more of our idealizing assumptions to explore
how outcomes might be expected to change.
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(including judgments about whether a particular individual will
contribute to diversity).27
With these assumptions out of the way, it is helpful to
invoke a general axiom famously endorsed by the Supreme
Court, albeit in the context of a rather different issue. According
to the Court, "absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected
that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will, in time, result in a
workforce more or less representative of the racial and ethnic
composition of the population in the community from which
employees are hired."2 8 This general axiom, as applied to our
model, suggests that in the absence of employer
discrimination, 29 the level of workplace diversity among elite
law firms will, over time, be the same as the level of diversity
that exists in the student bodies of law schools. Whatever
diversity exists in elite student bodies will be randomly supplied
to all firms, with no single law firm having a higher or lower
level of diversity than others, except by operation of chance. 30
The assumed absence of discrimination might strike some
readers as overly simplistic, contradicted by empirical evidence
about ongoing employment discrimination. Any model that
assumes that away, the argument might be, assumes away too
much. Two responses are in order. First, if we do not assume
away discrimination, that variable becomes something of a
showstopper for our desired analysis. If employers are assumed
to discriminate, then of course workplace diversity will be
almost entirely a function of their exclusionary policies-full
stop. Thus, we might learn more about the structural relation
between educational and workplace diversity if we think about
what we would expect to happen in the absence of
discrimination.
27 We relax this assumption in Part II below.
28 Teamsters, 431 US at 339 n 20. The Court was addressing whether intentional
discrimination could be proved through the use of statistical evidence of disparities
between the racial composition of the employer's workforce and the local labor market.
29 Here we use "discrimination" to refer to actions-implicitly or explicitly
motivated-based on bias, prejudice, or preferences that operate to the disadvantage of
racial minorities. We do not count the use of pro-diversity racial preferences as
discrimination. We recognize that this may be a contested usage in the legal context of
Title VII interpretation.
so We might add that any observed statistically-significant disparities in levels of
diversity between firms could presumptively be attributed to discrimination (either
intentional or not) or to positive employer preferences for diversity.
356 [ 2014
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Second, and perhaps more importantly, imagining what we
would expect to happen in the absence of discrimination is an
important exercise because it puts us in a position to test
doctrinal developments on the Supreme Court over the past two
decades that restrict the ability of plaintiffs to bring
discrimination claims. 31 While it would be putting the point too
strongly to say that the Court's jurisprudential default with
respect to employment discrimination is to say that it does not
exist, it is fair to say that the federal courts have not been
sympathetic to such claims. 32 This is why white plaintiffs have
had an easier time bringing "reverse discrimination" claims than
people of color have had bringing discrimination claims. 33 Our
sense is that at least some members of the Supreme Court
would endorse the view that diversity initiatives in the
workplace are not necessary as a corrective for something that is
largely no longer a problem: employment discrimination. 34 The
thinking would be that if there is a qualified, diverse pool of
" See, for examples of recent Court decisions restricting plaintiffs' ability to bring
discrimination claims, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v Nassar, 133 S
Ct 2517, 2534 (2013) (holding that a plaintiff must show that protected activity, such as
complaining about employment discrimination, was a but-for cause of the alleged
adverse employment action); Vance v Ball State University, 133 S Ct 2434, 2439 (raising
the standard for who qualifies as a supervisor, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to
allege and prevail on employer liability).
32 See Kevin M. Clermont and Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 Harv L & Pol Rev 103, 115 (2009)
(arguing that empirical data on low success rates for employment discrimination
plaintiffs "raises the specter that federal appellate courts have a double standard for
employment discrimination cases, harshly scrutinizing employees' victories below while
gazing benignly at employers' victories"). See also Kerri Lynn Stone, Shortcuts in
Employment Discrimination Law, 56 SLU L J 111, 159-62 (2011) (summarizing recent
scholarship discussing judicial hostility toward employment discrimination claims).
" See, for example, Fisher, 133 S Ct at 2421 (reasserting the standard of strict
scrutiny that university affirmative action policies must comply with, on a case brought
by a white plaintiff alleging reverse discrimination); Ricci, 557 US at 593 (ordering entry
of summary judgment for white plaintiffs who brought discrimination claim against fire
department that sought to avoid disparate impact liability by discarding results of exams
required for promotion); Cheryl I. Harris and Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci:
Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L Rev 73, 103 (2010)
(discussing the ways in which antidiscrimination law has developed to privilege white
plaintiffs).
34 See Michael Selmi, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law: Changed
Doctrine for Changed Social Conditions *4 (George Washington Law School Public Law
Reasearch Paper No 2014-8), online athttp://ssrn.com/s013/papers.cfmabstract
id=2430378 (visited Oct 18, 2014) (arguing that the Supreme Court no longer sees
discrimination as a "default explanation" for disparities in workforce composition and
tends to be "entirely dismissive of the notion that there is any need for remedial action"
to correct for the effects of past discrimination).
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people of color, firms will hire them. Note how this view aligns
with the assumptions of our model-namely, the elite law
school's student body diversity will be supplied fully and
uniformly into the workplace.
In any event, our claim is that in a world in which our basic
assumptions hold true, the racial diversity that exists in the
graduating student bodies of elite law schools will be uniformly
distributed among all elite law firms, such that the level of
diversity in the group of students who enter the elite workplace
matches the level of diversity in the elite law student pool
overall. In other words, in the default conditions of our model,
workplace diversity simply reiterates student body diversity.
C. Modeling the Reiteration Effect Under Four Alternative
Conditions
If full and uniform reiteration is expected in our model's
default conditions, what might we expect to observe if we vary
both the law firm's and the law school's behavior? That is the
question we now take up. We will examine how the supply of
diversity from the law school to the law firm might vary under
four specific conditions. Condition I assumes that the level of
law school diversity is high and that the law firm is prohibited
from using affirmative action. Condition II imagines a low level
of law school diversity; here, too, the law firm may not use
affirmative action. Condition III permits the law firm to use
affirmative action and posits a high level of law school diversity.
Under Condition IV, the law firm is also permitted to use
affirmative action but the level of law school diversity is low. We
discuss below how each of these conditions might affect the
supply of student body diversity from the university (the law
school) to the workplace (the law firm).
1. Condition I: high educational diversity, employer
affirmative action prohibited.
Suppose that there is a high level of racial diversity in the
student bodies of elite law schools, such that the presence of
racial minorities in these student bodies is as high as or higher
than in the general population. (We might imagine a world in
which all elite law schools were permitted under applicable state
and federal law to consider the race of their applicants as a
positive factor in the admissions process, and all elite law
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schools did in fact do so). Stipulate also that law firms are not
legally permitted to take race into account in their hiring
decisions, in other words, that the law requires formally
colorblind hiring. What result should be expected, given the
assumptions of our model, for law firm diversity?
Assuming full compliance by law firms, we should expect
that, over time, all elite law firms would come to have the same
high level of diversity that is present in elite law school student
bodies. That is to say, the diversity of the student bodies will be
fully and uniformly supplied to the workplace. To understand
why, recall that we are assuming for purposes of analysis that
there is no explicit or implicit discrimination in the labor
market. Insofar as firms are not going to differentiate among
elite students (per our earlier hypothesis and explanation), we
should expect student body diversity to be supplied to-and be
randomly distributed among-all elite law firms. We would also
expect that, over time, every elite law firm would mirror the
demographic of the elite law school student bodies from which
they are populated. In short, under Condition I, workplace
diversity would be established at levels matching the diversity of
the student pool even without the utilization of employer
affirmative action.
2. Condition II: low educational diversity, employer
affirmative action prohibited.
In this condition, suppose that elite universities have low
levels of racial diversity, such that the proportion of racial
minorities in their student bodies is significantly lower than
their proportion in the general population. This scenario could
emerge in a jurisdiction (like California) that prohibits the
consideration of race in university admissions; the scenario
could also occur if, at some future point, the Supreme Court
overruled Grutter and held that affirmative action was
unconstitutional in the educational context. Assume, as in
Condition I, that the law prohibits race-conscious affirmative
action hiring. What result?
As in Condition I, we should expect that, under Condition
II, over time, all elite workplaces will come to share the
demographics of the student bodies from which they draw. That
is, all law firms will come to have an equally low level of racial
diversity. A formally colorblind hiring rule, again assuming
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non-discrimination, should reproduce the level of diversity
present in the elite student body pool at the workplace level of
the law firm. If the level of diversity in the overall pool of job
candidates is low, then colorblind hiring should produce an
equally low level of workplace diversity, uniformly distributed
among firms.
3. Condition III: high educational diversity, employer
affirmative action permitted.
In the third condition, stipulate that there is a high level of
diversity in elite law school student bodies, as in Condition I.
But now suppose that employers are permitted (but not
required) to consider job applicants' membership in a minority
racial group as a positive factor in their hiring decisions, if doing
so is reasonably necessary to create or maintain diversity in the
workplace. 35 What outcomes should we expect? The short
answer: roughly the same level and distribution of workplace
diversity as in Condition I, the condition with high diversity in
the labor market and no affirmative action.
This might seem counterintuitive. One might think a rule
permitting consideration of race for diversity purposes would
lead to variances among law firms in their levels of diversity.
But remember that firms are only permitted to employ
affirmative action "if reasonably necessary" to ensure diversity.
Since we stipulate in Condition III that there is a high level of
diversity in the pool of available candidates, and given our
overall assumption that this labor market is free of explicit or
implicit forms of discrimination and biases, employers should
not need to take race into account to yield meaningful diversity.
A sufficiently high level of diversity in the pool of available
candidates should, under formally colorblind hiring, be adequate
to supply that same level of diversity uniformly across all law
firms. Assuming that employers are aware of the racial
demographics of the pool, it is reasonable to conclude that they
would see little need to engage in affirmative action hiring and
" The qualification in our hypothetical rule permitting consideration of race only if
'reasonably necessary" is not based on current Title VII law; but if the Supreme Court
were to recognize a diversity-based justification for affirmative action in hiring, the
Court would surely impose some limitation of this sort, if not an even more restrictive
one.
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would refrain from doing so. 36 Combining the results from
Conditions I and III, we can conclude that in conditions of high
diversity in the available pool of job candidates, we should not
expect overall levels or the distribution of workplace diversity
across law firms to be significantly dependent on whether or not
employers are permitted to take race into account as a positive
hiring factor for the sake of diversity.
4. Condition IV: low educational diversity, employer
affirmative action permitted.
Our final condition assumes that there is a low level of
racial diversity in the student bodies of elite law schools. Recall
that this is also the case in Condition II. Stipulate now that, as
in Condition III, law firms are permitted (but not required) to
consider job applicants' race as a positive factor in their hiring
decisions. The caveat, again, is that they may do so only if
reasonably necessary to create or maintain diversity in the
workplace. Under this condition, what should we expect vis-A-vis
the overall supply and distribution of diversity in the workplace?
The results will depend on the extent to which law firms
give positive weight to race in their hiring decisions. If law firms
behave uniformly, then the results of Condition IV should be the
same as Condition II (the condition with low education diversity,
employer affirmative action prohibited). There are two ways in
which employers could act uniformly.
First, all law firms might refrain from using affirmative
action. This would render Condition IV indistinguishable from
Condition II, so the same results should follow. Second, all law
firms could decide to practice affirmative action. Under the
default assumptions of our model, elite law firms are all on
equal footing in terms of the likely success of their diversity
initiatives. Thus, a university's student body diversity would be
1 In Condition III, if an elite firm mistakenly believes that consideration of race is
necessary for workplace diversity, the firm will end up with a level of diversity that is
either equal to or higher than the level of diversity in the pool of available students. If
the firm's pro-diversity hiring results in a level of diversity that is equal to that in the
pool, then the firm's "unnecessary" consideration of race should have no effect on the
overall distribution of diversity among firms. If the firm, as a result of its positive
consideration of race, produces a higher level of diversity in its own workplace than is
present in the overall applicant pool, this might tend to cause an increased level of
diversity relative to the firms that perceive (correctly, according to our assumptions) that
consideration of race is not necessary.
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supplied uniformly to all elite workplaces. The overall level of
resultant law firm diversity will also likely be uniform. 37
But now let us imagine that elite firms have different views
regarding the importance of establishing diversity in their
workplaces. Assume that some firms give high priority to having
a diverse workforce, while other firms care less about diversity
as such, or are committed to an ideal of formally colorblind
hiring. Suppose, in other words, that only some elite firms
consider race as a positive consideration (call these
"pro-diversity" firms) while other firms do not take race into
consideration at all (call these "colorblind firms"). Under these
additional assumptions, what result should we expect for
workplace diversity among elite firms?
In our model, the amount of diversity in the elite law school
student body pool limits the diversity that can be reiterated into
the workplace, so we should expect the overall level of diversity
among all elite firms to be about as low as that observed in the
candidate pool. But unlike in previous conditions, we would
expect the distribution of that diversity to be non-uniform across
firms. Pro-diversity firms, insofar as they see a greater value in
establishing workforce diversity, will offer higher salaries or
expend more recruiting resources to lure job candidates who
would enhance or bolster the firm's diversity profile. Colorblind
firms, who by definition care less about diversity or are
ideologically committed to colorblindness, would have no reason
to make the extra expenditures necessary to attract the diverse
candidates away from pro-diversity firms and so would be less
likely to attract and hire them. Over time, therefore,
pro-diversity firms will come to have a higher level of workplace
diversity than colorblind firms. As student body diversity
1 One might think that the answer would depend on the ratio of elite students in
the available labor pool to available positions. If there are at least as many employment
positions available as there are elite students looking for jobs, then the uniform
application of affirmative action preferences by employers should not disrupt the full and
uniform propagation of the low level of diversity that exists in the elite student pool to
the workplace. However, if there are fewer employment positions available than elite
students in the pool, affirmative action will cause minority workers to be hired at a
greater rate than non-minority workers, which will result in a level of workplace
diversity that is higher than the level of diversity in the candidate pool. In this case, the
argument might go, the diversity would not only propagate to the workplace, but would
also be amplified. While this seems theoretically possible, it seems equally possible that
in conditions of job scarcity, employers would either consciously or unconsciously scale
back their affirmative action hiring upon reaching a certain "saturation" point for
workplace diversity. If so, then there would be no amplification effect.
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continues to cluster in pro-diversity firms from year to year,
pro-diversity firms will eventually achieve a level of diversity
that is higher than the level of diversity available in the elite
student body pool, and colorblind firms will eventually have a
level of diversity that is even lower than the already-low level
available in the candidate pool.
It may not seem particularly remarkable that in Condition
IV pro-diversity firms will come to achieve more workplace
diversity than colorblind firms, but there are two less obvious
points that bear mentioning. First, Condition IV is the only one
of the four conditions in which we would expect anything other
than a uniform distribution of diversity across all hiring firms.
In all other conditions, including Condition III, in which we
stipulated that employers are permitted to engage in pro-
diversity hiring, we would expect the diversity of the workplace
to be the same as the diversity of the relevant labor pool.
Second, a comparison of Conditions II and IV shows that where
the diversity of the available candidate pool is very low, an
employment rule that permits but does not require pro-diversity
hiring may result in a lumpy distribution of diversity among
hiring firms. As a result, some firms might come to have high
levels of diversity, while other firms would have minimal or no
diversity. In contrast, an employment rule that requires
colorblind hiring in conditions of low labor market diversity will
tend to produce an even, albeit low, level of diversity among all
hiring firms.
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D. Summary
The table below summarizes
four conditions.
the results of the preceding
CONDITION LEVEL OF IS LEVEL OF IS
EDUCATIONAL AFFIRMATIVE EMPLOYMENT DIVERSITY
DIVERSITY ACTION DIVERSITY SPREAD
PERMITTED? UNIFORMLY
ACROSS
EMPLOYER?
High No High Yes
II Low No Low Yes
III High Yes High Yes
IV Low Yes Depends on uniformity Yes (if
among employers: employers
Non- Uniformity act
uniformity among uniformly)
among employers No (if
employers employers
High Low act non-
(pro- uniformly)
diversity
firm)
Low
(Colorblind
firm)
The following five conclusions flow from these results. First,
even when one takes into account the diversity practices of
firms-that is, whether they engage in or refrain from using
affirmative action hiring-the diversity of law school student
bodies (the diversity supply) remains crucial to the analysis.
Second, a similar point can be made with respect to law:
whatever the governing legal regime with respect to whether
employers are permitted to use affirmative action, the diversity
of university student bodies will play an important role in
shaping the diversity of the workplace. These two points
highlight the importance of affirmative action in the educational
domain. It is a significant mechanism through which diversity is
supplied to the labor market.
This brings us to our third point: there are only two ways in
our model to achieve high diversity in all elite workplaces. One
is to ensure high diversity in elite student bodies. The other is to
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induce all law firms to engage in affirmative action in conditions
of job scarcity (creating an amplification effect).
Fourth, recall that Condition I-high educational
diversity/affirmative action prohibited-produces a high level of
diversity that is uniformly distributed across firms. This result
argues in favor of jettisoning employment affirmative action if
we have robust educational affirmative action. The latter will
necessarily be supplied to the former. That is indeed the story
our theoretical model tells. But a limitation of our model is that
we assume away discrimination in the marketplace. If we add
discrimination back into the model-and not necessarily
intentional, invidious discrimination but simply unconscious,
implicit bias-the results under Condition I would change.
Firms whose decision-making reflects implicit bias would have a
lower level of diversity than firms whose decision-making does
not reflect this bias. For many proponents of affirmative action,
this is precisely what affirmative action is designed to
counteract-biases (implicit and explicit) in the labor market.
Fifth, understanding the foregoing limitation of our model is
especially important in light of the Supreme Court's
commitment to colorblindness and general judicial skepticism
about workplace discrimination. 38 This is a point we made
earlier but bears emphasizing here. Condition I is, for us,
decidedly theoretical. However, for the conservative justices on
the Court, Condition I might well be an assumed reality. That
has implications for the future of affirmative action in the
context of the workplace. If a majority of the Supreme Court
concludes that workplace discrimination is a thing of the past, it
could conclude that, even if affirmative action is necessary in the
context of university admissions to achieve student body
diversity, it is unnecessary in the context of the workplace,
because the diversity of the student body would be reiterated
into the workplace.
Our sixth and final conclusion is this: in low educational
diversity conditions, rules that permit pro-diversity hiring will
likely result in racial clustering, and law firms will separate
themselves over time into high-diversity and low-diversity
workplaces. 39 This has implications for jurisdictions like
" See Stone, 56 SLU L J at 159-62 (cited in note 32).
39 We say this is likely in our model, not certain, because clustering would not occur
if all employers act in perfect unison with respect to their permitted use of pro-diversity
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California that prohibit state universities from engaging in
affirmative action. Some employees might find themselves in
law firms in which there is meaningful diversity, but most will
not. Still, to the extent that having meaningful diversity in some
workplaces (Condition IV) is better than having low diversity
across all workplaces (Condition II), we should ensure that the
prohibition of affirmative action in the context of education is
not extended to the context of employment.
II. DIVERGENT DIVERSITY SCREENS: COMPLICATING THE
REITERATION DYNAMIC
In modeling the supply of diversity from elite law schools to
elite law firms in Part I, we assumed that law firms and law
schools share a common notion of "diversity." This need not be
the case. A law firm might employ very different criteria than
law schools. Law schools are admitting students to service
multiple markets, including the public interest markets.
Moreover, law schools want students who will facilitate the
robust exchange of ideas. This includes students who have
evidenced leadership in identity-specific organization as well of
those who have engaged in student organizational efforts
around diversity. The very rationale for affirmative action is
predicated on admitted students who will advance these
institutional interests. 40
It is hard to imagine very many law firms seeking out
applicants who are likely to be what we might call institutional
activists (analogous to the student activist in the law school
context). Law firms may want very different kinds of diversity.
Their corporate market context will presumably shape the kind
of-and how much-diversity they pursue. For example, while
law firms are prohibited from invoking customer preferences to
justify screening their application pool for racially palatable
African Americans, presumably at least some firms end up (at
least implicitly) doing just that.
To recognize that law schools and law firms do not
necessarily employ the same diversity screens is not to say that
their diversity initiatives must be regarded as autonomous.
preferences.
40 See Devon W. Carbado, Intraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L Rev 1130, 1148 (2013)
(discussing how universities can screen for different types of diversity).
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Indeed, we claim the opposite. For one thing, law firms and law
schools might actually employ precisely the same diversity
criteria (for example, looking for people who will facilitate racial
cooperation and understanding), in which case we might say
that their screens expressly converge. For another, even when
law firm and law school diversity criteria do not expressly
converge in this way, the diversity that actually arises in each
context could nevertheless appear to converge on a
shared conception.
Suppose, for example, that law firms care more than law
schools about weeding out individuals with poor teamwork
attributes. One might assume that this might cause law firm
diversity to diverge from law school diversity. That is possible.
But on the other hand, law firms might find that the experience
of a diverse elite law school prepares students of all backgrounds
to work productively and harmoniously in heterogeneous social
settings. If this were true, even law firms that prioritize
teamwork might be happy to accept, without much further
screening, whatever type of diversity law schools produce. The
general point is that if law firms perceive value in the diversity
produced by law schools, they might seek to capitalize on that
value by reproducing it in their workplaces.
Finally, law school and law firm diversity initiatives are not
autonomous in another way: any diversity criteria the law firm
utilizes at the hiring stage will necessarily piggyback on the
diversity efforts of the law school at the admissions stage. As
argued above, the diversity of law schools creates the diversity of
the labor pool from which law firms hire. 4 1
While keeping in mind these ways in which law school and
law firm diversity initiatives are connected, we turn our focus in
this Part to how law school and law firm initiatives can diverge.
To appreciate how law firm and law school diversity screening
can diverge and the implications of that divergence for the
reiteration effect, let us call the set of minority individuals who
are the beneficiaries of affirmative action at the law school
admissions stage "Law School Diverse" or "LS-Diverse"
41 The diversity of law schools is, in turn, determined in part by the diversity of the
undergraduate institutions that supply their applicant pools. For purposes of our
analysis, we have been taking the diversity of the law school applicant pool as given, but
one might well hypothesize the existence of supply, reiteration, and demand effects in
the interactions between law schools and undergraduate colleges.
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individuals. And let us call the set of minority individuals who
are beneficiaries at the law firm hiring stage "Law Firm
Diverse" or "LF-Diverse" individuals. Some minorities might be
both LS-Diverse and LF-Diverse, while others might be neither.
Consider the ways in which the set of LS-Diverse
individuals might relate to LF-Diverse individuals:
Quantitatively, the LF-Diverse group could be larger than,
smaller than, or the same size as the LS-Diverse group.
Qualitatively, the LF-Diverse group could overlap the
LS-Diverse group in whole, in part, or not at all. These various
possibilities could be combined in a large number of ways. We
will not attempt to march through all of the permutations, but a
few comments are in order.
There are various reasons why the set of people who are the
beneficiaries of LF-Diversity initiatives might be different from
those who previously benefitted from LS-Diversity initiatives.
The two sets might be quantitatively different simply because
universities and employers give different weight to racial
considerations in the selection process. A heavier weighting will
naturally tend to result in a larger set of individuals who benefit
from the diversity initiative.
There might also be systemic reasons that could explain
quantitative divergence between LS-Diversity and LF-Diversity.
For example, if law schools engage in robust affirmative action
measures and succeed in creating highly diverse student bodies,
who then form the labor pool from which law firms hire, law
firms might perceive that there is less of a need for them to use
pro-diversity affirmative action in order to achieve significant
workplace diversity. They may assume, per our discussion in
Part I, that the diversity in the labor market will naturally
"trickle up" or be reiterated into the firm. This might be
especially true of firms that conceive of themselves as
non-discriminatory. These firms would see little need to employ
affirmative action as a prophylactic against the possibility of
discrimination. Under this scenario, the set of people who
benefit from LF-Diversity efforts may be low relative to the set
of people who benefit from LS-Diversity efforts.
In short, aggressive and successful use of affirmative action
at the law school level could create an incentive for some law
firms to decrease the use of affirmative action at the
employment level. When this occurs, quantitatively speaking,
LS-Diversity initiatives and LF-Diversity initiatives will be
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inversely correlated. This suggests that it is important that law
firms are made aware of the subtle but significant ways in which
race can affect their decision-making even when they are
committed to nondiscrimination. That awareness will make
them less inclined to jettison their affirmative action policies on
the view that the diversity of the labor pool will necessarily be
reiterated into the workplace.
Law firm and law school affirmative action initiatives might
also yield different sets of beneficiaries for reasons having to do
with the context dependent nature of diversity initiatives.
LF-Diversity might be qualitatively different from LS-Diversity.
Employers and universities might look for different
characteristics in constructing their institutional diversities.
Employers might, for example, screen candidates for
compatibility with their corporate culture in ways that constrain
their pro-diversity hiring. 42 In some cases, what might appear to
be facially-neutral screening criteria might cause LF-Diversity
selections to be negatively correlated with LS-Diversity
selections. A silly example: a law firm might screen in favor of
minority candidates who, in addition to attending elite law
schools, attended prestigious private prep schools. But minority
law students with prep school backgrounds might be less likely
than others to have benefited from affirmative action at the law
school admissions stage-that is, less likely to be LS-Diverse. If
so, then law firm screening for minorities who attended
prestigious private prep schools could cause LF-Diversity to be
negatively correlated with LS-Diversity.
Law firm diversity and law school diversity might diverge in
other ways. Elite law firms and elite law schools might have
different ideas about the characteristics (in addition to simple
racial phenotype) that could make one person preferable to
another from the standpoint of enhancing the institution's
diversity. The basic educational goals and academic principles
that define the mission of elite universities (of which elite law
schools are a part) do not apply to most elite employers. 43 The
value of diversity in the educational context, or at least the
42 For purposes of this discussion, we still assume, as in Part I, that employers
regard all graduates of elite universities as comparably qualified for positions in their
workplaces, but we introduce the possibility that employers might consider
characteristics other than objective qualifications in constructing their workforce.
43 See Fisher, 133 S Ct at 2418 (stating that the "academic mission of a university is
a special concern of the First Amendment'), quoting Bakke, 438 US at 312.
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value that has been assigned constitutional significance,
encompasses a well known m6lange of goods, including
enhanced educational discourse, eradication of racial stereotypes
and other types of de-biasing, reduction of racial isolation,
preparation for citizenry in a pluralistic society, providing good
modeling for minority youth, create a visible path for minorities
leading to leadership roles in society, and so on.4 4 Against the
background of these interests, a law school might make special
efforts to enroll students from racial minority groups who are
most likely to bring an overtly "racial perspective" to classroom
discussions, which might include minority students who have
the least in common with most other students with respect to
their backgrounds and experiences, in order to activate
discourse benefits as envisioned in Grutter and Regents of the
University of California v Bakke.45
Law firms might also have an interest in fostering diverse
perspectives in the workplace on a different basis, such as the
belief that this would improve its ability to anticipate client or
customer needs. But, overriding concerns about workplace
harmony might make employers wary of hiring individuals who
will have trouble fitting into the corporate culture.4 6 This does
not mean that these institutions would seek individuals who
dis-identify with their race or embrace a colorblind sense of self.
Increasingly, corporate cultures are interested in establishing
so-called "affinity groups," that is, groups that are organized
around specific identities (such as, being gay or lesbian, a person
of color, or a woman). While these groups are less prevalent in
the law firm context, elite law firms are still interested in hiring
people of color who will perform palatable or modest forms of
racial diversity work. The point is that it will be the rare elite
law firm that would hire an African American because that
person will shake up the firm's institutional culture. This is
precisely the kind of person an elite law school might admit.
More generally, the benefits that law schools as academic
institutions might seek to advance will not necessarily readily
44 See Carbado, 60 UCLA L Rev at 1143-47 (cited in note 40) (analyzing discussions
of the benefits of diversity in higher education in Bakke and Grutter).
4' 438 US 265 (1977).
46 Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Book Review, The Law and Economics of
Critical Race Theory, 112 Yale L J 1757, 1789-95 (2003) (surveying the literature on the
extent to which corporate workplaces are often structured to achieve homogeneity).
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map onto the priorities of a typical (non-academic) employer's
workplace. To be clear: this is not to say that law firms will
perceive no value in diversity. The point, instead, is that even
when they perceive positive value in a diverse workforce they
may have different reasons than law schools for doing so.
A final reason that law firm diversity screens might be
different from law school diversity screens is that the employer
may be hiring from a pool that has already been made diverse
through affirmative action at an earlier screening stage (the
admissions process). This fact may have varying implications.
One possibility is that a law firm might make fine distinctions
between minority individuals within the pool who may have
been equal beneficiaries of pro-diversity admissions criteria. It
might do so, for example, in order to screen out individuals
whom it perceives would clash with its corporate culture.
Much of the foregoing is speculative. That should not
obscure that our analysis is theoretically grounded in the fact
that law firms and law schools operate under different incentive
systems with respect to their pursuit of diversity. The difference
in their incentive structures means that elite law firms may
utilize different diversity-screening criteria than law schools.
III. THE DEMAND EFFECT
In Part II, we explored the implications of law firms and law
schools employing different diversity screens. We assumed that
these diversity-promoting criteria are stable over time and that
they are independently fixed within each context. In this Part,
we relax the latter assumptions to explore the possibility that
universities might adjust their admissions policies in response
to observed employment patterns, including employers' (here,
the law firm's) revealed preferences about the kind of diversity
they want.
At the outset, we should be clear to indicate that at least
two factors could shape the extent of a law firm's interest in
diversity: the law firm's substantive commitment to diversity
and the law firm's symbolic commitment to diversity. With
respect to the substantive commitment, a law firm might be
committed to diversity because the firm's leadership thinks that
pursuing diversity (a) is the right thing to do, (b) will improve
workplace efficiency and productivity, and (c) provides access to
markets. With respect to the symbolic commitment, a law firm
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might simply want to signal diversity to avoid the reputational
costs of not doing so. The question we explore now is how a law
firm's interest in diversity can shape the kind of diversity a law
school seeks to advance.
Our starting point is that elite law schools operate in a
competitive market. While their primary mission may be
educational and academic, they compete with each other to
attract exceptional students who will enrich the community,
perform to the highest academic standards, and make valuable
contributions to society after they graduate. One way in which
law schools attract students is by trying to outperform their peer
institutions in placing their graduates in the most desirable
jobs. If they are unable to compete with other law schools in
achieving placement of graduates on the job market, the best
students will decide to matriculate elsewhere. This will erode
the affected universities' prestige and academic standing,
eventually making it difficult for them to maintain their status
among their elite peers. The fact that placement rates figure
significantly in the overall ranking of law schools makes this
dynamic all the more significant. 4
47 Law school rankings tend to roughly match post-law school placement rates, and
in recent years, with a soft legal job market in the wake of the 2008 Mortgage Meltdown,
placement rates have become a weightier component of the key U.S. News and World
Report ranking. See, for example, Elizabeth G. Olson, And the U.S. News Law School
Ranking Fallout Begins . . ., (Fortune Mar 11, 2014), online at
http://fortune.com/2014/03/1 1/and-the-u-s-news-law-school-ranking-fallout-begins/
(visited Oct 18, 2014); Jordan Weissmann, The Jobs Crisis at Our Best Law Schools Is
Much, Much Worse Than You Think (Atlantic Monthly Apr 9, 2013), online at
http: //www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/04/the-jobs-crisis-at-our-best-law-
schools-is-much-much-worse-than-you-think/274795/ (visited Oct 18, 2014). The weak
post-2008 legal job market has dramatically refocused public attention on law schools'
placement rates for their graduates. 2011 and 2012 saw fifteen mostly lower-tier law
schools sued by alumni for alleged fraud and misrepresentation regarding
post-graduation placement rates, with threats of extending the rash of lawsuits to an
ever-broadening spectrum of schools, though seemingly those threats never materialized.
See, for example, Martha Neil, 12 More Law Schools Sued Over Reporting of Law Grad
Employment and Salary Stats (ABA J Feb 1, 2012), online at
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/12 more law schools sued in consumer-
fraud-class action re reportedlaw/ (visited Oct 18, 2014); Sarah Mui, Grads Sue New
York Law School and Cooley Law, Saying They Inflated Job and Salary Stats (ABA J
Aug 10, 2011), online at http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/grads-sue-new
yorklaw-school and cooley_1aw saying they-inflated-job-and s/ (visited Oct 18, 2014);
Katherine Mangan, Lawsuits Over Job-Placement Rates Threaten 20 More Law Schools
(Chronicle of Higher Ed Mar 14, 2012), online at http: //chronicle.
com/article/Lawsuits-Over-Job-Placement/131163/ (visited Oct 18, 2014). Scandals
regarding misreporting of data to U.S. News and World Report led to resignations at
other law schools, and legal scholars produced law review articles discussing theories of
liability for legal actions against law schools and their administrators. See generally
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The competition to place graduates in desirable jobs gives
rise to an incentive for universities to admit more of the types of
students who are sought by employers when they graduate, and
fewer of the types of students who are not.4 8 Law schools may
have multiple reasons to admit or not admit a particular type of
student. In general, to the extent that employers actively seek
graduates who possess some discernible set of characteristics,
universities will have an added incentive to look for those
characteristics in the students they admit. If law firms tend not
to hire graduates with some set of characteristics, then law
schools will have less reason to admit applicants fitting that
type.
There is no reason that this demand effect should not apply
to characteristics associated with enhancing workplace
diversity. If elite law firms give priority in their hiring to elite
law school graduates who possess diversity-enhancing
characteristics, law schools will have an added incentive to
screen in favor of those characteristics at the admissions stage. 49
That is to say, other things equal,50 law schools have an
incentive to adopt admissions criteria that tend to produce
Morgan Cloud and George Shepherd, Law Deans in Jail, 77 Mo L Rev 931 (2012); Ben
Trachtenberg, Law School Marketing and Legal Ethics, 91 Neb L Rev 866 (2013). The
mood of crisis helped bring a new ABA accreditation standard requiring greater law
school transparency regarding placement data. Mark Hansen, ABA Committee Approves
New Law School Disclosure Requirements (ABA J Jan 17, 2012), online at
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba committee recommends new law school d
isclosure requirements/ (visited on Oct 18, 2014). All of this recent commotion suggests
that placement rates are likely very much on the minds of prospective law students as
well as of law school administrators.
48 Significantly, law schools are very much aware of where their students end up.
For at least the past two decades, largely because of law school rankings, but also to
facilitate alumni relationships and giving, law schools have been keeping fairly accurate
records about where the graduates go. See, for example, Recent Graduate Employment
Data (The University of Chicago Law School), online at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/
prospective/employmentdata (visited Oct 18, 2014).
49 And all the more so if, as seems reasonable to believe, affirmative action
admittees carry a higher marginal cost than regular admittees (for example, higher
recruitment, student support, and perhaps political costs). On the other hand, some or
all of these added costs may be offset by the value of expected improvements to the
quality of the educational experience resulting from a more diverse school is able to offer.
'o We readily concede that other things may not be equal. For example, if
LF-Diversity is insufficient to fully activate the educational benefits that might be
possible with other modes of diversity, then universities might give priority to
achievement of those educational benefits even at the cost of marginally lower
employment of graduates. But our point is that employer demand for a particular type of
diversity will exert a pull in that direction, not that the value of LF-Diversity will
necessarily trump all other law school values.
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LF-Diverse graduates. The demand exerted by employers for
graduates meeting their diversity criteria could cause law firm
diversity initiatives and law school diversity initiatives to
converge over time. 51 Whether this occurs likely will depend on
the strength of the law firm's diversity demand and the strength
of the incentive for the law school to respond to this demand. 52
IV. CONCLUSION: SOME IMPLICATIONS OF OUR MODEL
Our point of departure was the claim that law school and
law firm diversity are intertwined. What happens in one setting
impacts the other. We then moved on to show some of the
specific ways in which the two contexts interact, including a
discussion of how law firm diversity initiatives might modulate
the flow of diversity from law schools to law firms, and how
those initiatives might in turn loop back to influence the
behavior of law school admissions committees. We conclude by
suggesting several implications of our account for the
development and promotion of workplace diversity.
First, the existence of diversity in the supply of labor that
feeds into the employment market is a necessary condition of
workplace diversity. Workplace diversity cannot be created from
thin air. And insofar as law school student body diversity
depends on educational affirmative action, it follows that
educational affirmative action is a necessary condition of
workplace diversity. In other words, in addition to constituting a
law school's entering class, law school admissions constitute the
future law firm application pool from which law firms hire.
Second, there is a quantitative and a qualitative dimension
to this supply function. Quantitatively, the more aggressively
pro-diversity the law school's admissions criteria, the more
" We would not predict complete convergence because satisfying employer demand
is only part of (and concededly, perhaps only a small part of) the educational benefit of a
diverse student body. See discussion in Part I above.
12 The strength of this incentive would turn on (a) how important employment
rankings are to the overall ranking of the institution, (b) how much attention students
pay to employment rates and/or rankings, and (c) whether jobs are scarce. As to the
scarcity of jobs, we note that in conditions of full employment, the demand effect will be
weak, unless employers actively avoid hiring students who are LS-Diverse-a possibility
that is factored out by our initial assumptions of Part I. The demand effect will be most
pronounced when law firms implement diversity initiatives in conditions of job scarcity.
In those conditions, LF-Diverse students will be hired at a disproportionately higher rate
than all other students, giving rise to an incentive for law schools to admit more
students fitting that profile.
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diverse the hiring pool. Qualitatively, the stronger the
convergence between the kind of diversity in which a law firm is
interested and the kind of diversity a law school seeks to
advance, the greater the likelihood that the law firm will rely on
the law school's construction of diversity rather than
implementing its own screens, and thus the greater the
likelihood that the law school's diversity will be reiterated into
the law firm.
Third, by and large, we ought not worry about law schools
engaging in "too much" affirmative action. Law firm behavior in
this regard will be disciplined by the competitive markets in
which they operate. But the same goes for the behavior of
universities. Diversity initiatives in the educational context are,
after all, voluntary. Universities have no reason to engage in
affirmative action beyond a level that balances educational
usefulness with whatever demand for diversity actually exists in
the employment market.
Finally, we should query whether the story we tell about the
demand effect means that law firms may be exerting too much
pressure on law schools to conform their conception of diversity
to the model that happens to prevail in the workplace. Law
schools might have good reasons to offer admission to the
iconoclastic, overtly racialized student with a penchant for
challenging hierarchy and complacency with the status quo.
Law firms might be more reticent in offering that student a
job-and that might affect the law school's willingness to offer
admission.
Similarly, law firms and law schools might have a very
different sense of how much diversity is enough. "Critical
mass" 53 from a law firm's perspective might look very different
from "critical mass" from the perspective of the law school-and
the former might end up shaping the latter. To put this another
way, if law firms have a diversity saturation point or a diversity
" Grutter, 539 US at 340-41 (holding that a university admissions policy to
generate a "critical mass" of diverse students does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause).
345] 375
376 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
ceiling, law schools have an incentive to adjust their affirmative
action efforts to keep the diversity of their student bodies below
that level. The concern, in short, is that the demand effect can
influence both the quantitative and the qualitative supply of
diversity throughout the loop. This suggests that we ought to
begin a conversation about whether there are ways to effectuate
a counterbalancing force so that a law school's quantitative and
qualitative commitments to diversity are not only shaped by, but
also shape how law firms articulate their vision of a diverse
workplace.
